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EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF A CHATTEL
SECURITY INTEREST: A PLEA FOR THE
BONA FIDE PURCHASER
JESSE S. RAPHAEL*
INTRODUCTION

(HATTEL security is big business. Installment sales of durable goods
to consumers in the United States involved an outstanding credit, as
of September 1959, of over thirty-seven billion dollars. Of this outstanding credit over sixteen billion dollars concerned time-payment sales
of automobiles.' Almost all, if not all, of this credit, was expressed legally in the form of "time paper," that is, of installment contracts-usually conditional sales agreements or chattel mortgages-in which the
creditor is given a security interest in the chattel sold as a means of
obtaining payment in the event the consumer-debtor fails to pay.
The security contract contemplates that the subject chattel will be
more or less in use and at rest in the state in which the debtor-buyer
resides or has his place of business. The security contract ordinarily
provides that the chattel is not to be moved from that place without the
knowledge and consent of the secured party.
But people and their possessions do not stay put. State borders offer
no barriers to movement. Modern facilities for quick transportation from
state to state, the exigencies of business and of life encourage frequent
interstate movement. In addition, agencies for the rapid disposal of used
chattels are widespread. Dealers in used automobiles are an especially
familiar phenomenon in every locality. Suppose, therefore, a buyer of a
chattel subject to a security interest moves the chattel, with or without
the consent of the secured party, to another state and there disposes of it
in the ordinary channels of used goods trade. How should modern courts
adjust the conflicting claims of the secured party and the subpurchaser?
Stated in legal terms, the problem concerns the conflict in the claim,
on the one hand, of a creditor who has by contract acquired a security
interest in the chattel in one state (which for convenience will be hereinafter termed the Contract State), and the claim, on the other hand, of a
bona fide purchaser for value of that chattel who has bought it in another
state (hereinafter for convenience called the Removal State), to which
the chattel has been removed by the debtor with or without the consent
or knowledge of the "secured" creditor. The problem confronts the forum
* Member of the New York Bar, Professor of Law, Pace College, New York.
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in which the chattel is presently located and in which the parties seek
relief. That forum may be either in the Removal State or in a third state
in which the chattel comes to rest while the "secured" party or his
successor in interest, and the bona fide purchaser, or his successors in
interest, litigate their claims, each asking that his claim prevail over the
other.
Our discussion will involve consideration of the manner in which the
problem has actually been disposed of by the courts of the various
states, either pursuant to case law or statute, or the so-called rules of the
conflict of laws; the various theories underlying the decisions of the fori;
the principles which the author believes should have been applied;
and some suggestions as to how the problem may be finally laid to rest
with justice and fairness to both parties.
To avoid repetition, unless the context shows otherwise, the term
"debtor," when used in this discussion, will signify the person who owes
performance of the obligation secured and who has every proprietary right
in the chattel, which is the subject matter of the security, except those
rights which are possessed by the creditor under the security agreement.
The term "secured party" will mean a party who advances credit and by
contract with the debtor in the Contract State obtains a security interest
in a chattel which, under the laws of the Contract State, he perfects as
against bona fide purchasers from the debtor, the chattel remaining in
the possession of the debtor. The term "bona fide subpurchaser" will
mean a party who, for value and without notice or knowledge of the
secured party's interest, buys the chattel from the debtor in the Removal
State to which the debtor has brought the chattel, with or without the
consent of the secured party.
An examination of the cases, with regard merely to the outcome of the
litigation, reveals that they fall into three classifications.2 In an overwhelming majority of the fori, the secured party prevails over the bona
fide subpurchaser if the chattel was removed from the Contract State
without the knowledge or consent of the secured party.' If, however, the
secured party knew of the removal at the time it took place, or it was
intended under the original security agreement that the chattel would be
removed, the majority of the courts hold that the secured party will not
prevail, unless he perfects his security interest in the Removal State as
against bona fide subpurchasers by whatever procedures are required by
2.

Stumberg, Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict of Laws, 27 Iowa L. Rev.

528, 537 (1942).
3. See, e.g., Denkins Motor Co. v. Humphreys, 310 Ky. 344, 220 S.W.2d 847

(1949);

Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. West, 260 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App. 1953). See also Cleveland
Mach. Works v. Lang, 67 N.H. 348, 31 At. 20 (1893).

1959]

CHATTEL SECURITY INTERESTS

the local laws of the Removal State. 4 There are, however, a few courts
which hold that the bona fide subpurchaser prevails, whether or not the
secured party has knowledge of, or consents to, the removal of the chattel
to the Removal State.'
In almost all of the cases where there is judicial discussion of the
reasons for granting judgment in favor of the secured party, it is stated
that the courts feel obliged, despite their own local laws, to apply the law
of the state wherein it is determined that the secured party has obtained
his security interest, in accordance with the principle of comity. But
in determining the basis for the adoption of the outside law, different
theories are enunciated.

VARIOUS

APPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ComITY

Some courts base their decision on what, for convenience, shall be
called the Contract Theory.6 A typical case following this theory is
Studebaker Bros. Co. v. Mau.7 Here, the plaintiff, on May 2, 1903,
sold a buggy and accessories to Secrist and Mahan on a conditional sale.
The contract of sale was made and the chattels delivered in Salt Lake
City, Utah, where the plaintiff had its place of business and Secrist and
Mahan resided. Some time thereafter, without the knowledge and consent
of the conditional vendor, the chattels were removed by Mahan to Wyoming and there sold to defendant Mau on September 12, 1903, for cash.
Mau had no knowledge or notice of plaintiff's claim, and did not know
that the property had been removed from Utah until just before the
action was commenced. Plaintiff sued in the Wyoming court to recover
possession of the buggy. The laws of Utah required chattel mortgages to
be filed with the county clerk in order to be valid as against bona fide
purchasers but conditional sales were valid as against such purchasers
without recording. In Wyoming at this time, however, conditional sales
4. Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664 (1876); Robbins v.
Bostonian, 138 F.2d 622 (Sth Cir. 1943); Summers v. Carbondale Mach. Co., 116 Ark. 246,
173 S.W. 194 (1915).
5. See, e.g., Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887 (1921); Judy v. Evans, 109
111. App. 154 (1903); Delop & Co. v. Windsor & Randolph, 26 La. Ann. 185 (1874);
Boydson v. Goodrich, 49 Alich. 65, 12 N.W. 913 (1882); Bank v. Carr, 15 Pa. Super. 346
(1900); Consolidated Garage Co. v. Chambers, 111 Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1072 (1921);
Farmer v. Evans, 111 Tex. 283, 233 S.W. 101 (Civ. App. 1921); Union Sec. Co. v.
Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513 (1925).

6. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws, 399-400 (2d ed. 1951), citing Gross v. Jordan, 83 Me.
380, 22 AUt. 250 (1891): "The tendency of the cases has been to deal with problems of
title arising between the seller and buyer as involving questions of contracts." See also
Thomas G. Jewett, Jr., Inc. v. Keystone Driller Co., 282 Mlass. 469, 185 N.E. 369 (1933).
7. 13 Wyo. 358, 80 Pac. 151 (1905).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

were void, as against bona fide purchasers, unless the original or a copy
of the contract was filed in the office of the county where the property was
located.
The Wyoming court, allowing the outstate secured party to prevail,
said in part:
Where . . . a conditional sale of personal property is made in one state between
parties residing in that state, and where the property is then situated and delivered,
and without any agreement or intention that the property is to be removed to another state . . . and the conditional vendee, without the knowledge or consent of
the vendor, removes the property to another state and there sells it to a bona fide
purchaser, such purchaser acquires only such rights in the property as the conditional vendee had therein. . . In such cases the lex loci contractus will govern.
The rule is stated in Keenan v. Stimson, 32 Minn. 377, 20 N.W. 364, to be
that the validity and effect of contracts relating to personal property are to be
determined by the laws of the state or country where they are made, and, as a
matter of comity, they will, if valid there, be enforced in another state or country,
although not executed or recorded according to the laws of the latter.8

To the Wyoming court, the rule of comity apparently meant that by
the conditional sales contract made in Utah, certain interests in the
chattel were acquired by the conditional vendor, and by the same contract, certain restrictions were placed on the powers of the conditional
vendee in dealing with the chattel. When the chattel was removed to
Wyoming, without the conditional vendor's consent, the latter's contractual rights in the chattel and the vendee's contractual lack of power
of disposition followed the chattel into Wyoming. This should be recognized as such by a court of Wyoming regardless of prevailing Wyoming
law, which, had it been applied, would have determined the interests and
powers of the conditional vendor and vendee differently.
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied entirely on the rule of conflict of laws as to the proper choice of law in determining the nature,
validity and effect of contracts. The application of that rule to a simple,
uncomplicated transaction may be logically supported by arguing that
the parties in entering into a contract have in mind the laws of the state
in which they are contracting. Such laws become a part of the contract
as though they had been expressly set forth in its terms. When, therefore, the same parties are later in legal conflict in another state in respect
of this contract, their contractual intentions are properly and naturally
spelled out in terms of the lex loci contractus. Even this simple rule is
not universally applied and has given rise to much confusion as to the
proper application of the rule.9 For example, the parties may have made
8. Id. at 369, 80 Pac. at 154.
9. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 110, at 321 (3d ed. 1949); Stumberg, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 227.
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their contract en passant, with no regard at all for the laws of the state
in which they were contracting. In fact, in many cases, they might have
definitely had in mind the laws of the state where the contract was to be
performed or, if the contract dealt with property, the laws of the state
where the property was located at the time the contract was made, or at
the time it was to be performed.' 0
Whatever may be a proper rule as to conflict of laws relating to contracts, is that rule relevant to a solution of the security interest problem
we are now discussing? The original parties to the security contract are
not in litigation in the Removal State. A stranger to that contract, the
subpurchaser, is claiming an interest in the chattel, not derived from the
original contract, but created by a new contract made in the Removal
State. It cannot be asserted (so as to bring in the lex loci contraclus)
that the bona fide subpurchaser of the chattel had in mind or had any
knowledge of the contract creating the security interest in the Contract
State, or that he had any knowledge that such a security interest had in
fact been created prior to the time of his purchase. Having neither notice
nor knowledge of the security interest, the subpurchaser can hardly be
claimed to have made his own contract of subpurchase with regard to it
or to the original contract which created it.
Indeed, in the litigation in the Removal State between the secured party
and the bona fide subpurchaser, the problem is not a contract problem
at all, but a question of priority of property interests. Chief Justice
Marshall recognized this in Harrisonv. Sterry:"
The law of the place where a contract is made is, generally speaking, the law of
the contract; i.e., it is the law by which the contract is expounded. But the right
It is extrinsic, and is rather a personal
of priority forms no part of the contract ....
privilege, dependent on the law of the place where the property lies, and where the
court sits which is to decide the cause.

Some of the courts, in declaring that they are governed by the principle
of comity, base their decisions on what, for convenience, might be
characterized as the Situs Theory in conflict of laws as to chattel interests.
Most courts in adopting this theory take it to mean that when at the
time of the making of the security contract, the chattel has its situs in a
given state (usually the same state as the Contract State), rights and
interests in the chattel are to be determined by the lex loci rci, which the
court of the forum should apply. These courts usually recognize that
their choice of the lex loci rei is not compulsory and that they are free,
when their local laws or local public policy is in conflict therewith, to
10. Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 9, at 322-23; Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 6, at 401.
11. 9 U.S. (S Cranch.) 289, 298 (1809).
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ignore the lex loci rei and decide the case on the basis of local law and
policy.12
There are, however, those who maintain that interests created by the
security contract are, as soon as created, "vested interests" which no court
in any other jurisdiction has the right or power to disturb. Implicit in
the vested interest theory is the proposition that an interest in a chattel
created by contract in some mysterious way is attached to the chattel and
follows it from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Professor Beale has been, in
modern times, the most influential advocate of this vested interest
theory." His vigorous advocacy has had a material influence on the final
draft of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 4 but the theory itself has
been as vigorously criticized by other legal writers."5 If the theory were
carried out in practice in court decisions, there would be a strong basis
for compelling a Removal State to give "full faith and credit" to the
chattel interests created by contract in other states. A denial of such full
faith and credit could be attacked as a denial of due process under the
Constitution. No decision of the United States Supreme Court has gone
this far. 6 A statement of the reasons for rejecting the vested interest
theory is to be found in the following quotation, in which the Removal
State is called state "Y":
Despite the lack of direct authority on this point, it is submitted that Y's constitutional jurisdiction in the situation where removal was without the original owner's
consent cannot be successfully questioned. Any such attack, whether based on the
due process clause or the full faith and credit clause, must show that State Y lacks
a legitimate governmental interest in the title to the chattel brought within its borders. The existence of such governmental interest is acknowledged when the chattel
is normally present in the state; it is difficult to see why the interest does not exist
in like manner when the property is atypically present. Each state has constitutional
authority to make its own laws with respect to persons and events within its own
borders and any dealing with a chattel in State Y is an event, and remains an event,
despite17 the irregular methods by which the chattel came to be present within the
state.
12.
13.

Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664 (1876).
Beale, Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner in A Chattel, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 805

L. Rev. 43 (1918).
(1927). See also 13 II1.
14. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, §§ 265-66, 272-73 (1958).
15. See, e.g., Comment, Validity of Judgments Refusing Recognition To Chattel Mortgages Recorded In Another State, 37 Yale L.J. 966, 968 (1928), citing Dodd, The Power of
The Supreme Court To Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict Of Laws, 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 531 (1926). See also Cook, The Logical And Legal Bases Of The Conflict Of Laws,
33 Yale L.J. 457 (1924); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy And The Conflict Of
Laws, 33 Yale L.J. 736 (1924); Yntema, The Horn Book Method And The Conflict Of

Laws, 37 Yale L.J. 468 (1928).
16. See supra note 15. The consensus is that the constitutional clauses do not apply,
17. Note, The Power Of A State To Affect Title In A Chattel Atypically Removed
To It, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 773 (1947).
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The situs theory may have validity where the litigation concerns the
original parties to the security contract, for the same reasons as have
been previously expressed with regard to the contract theory.
The essential weakness in the situs and vested interest theories, as
applied to our problem, is the semantic twist which rcifies the legal position of the secured party and fails to ascribe to that position its essential
nature, namely, that it is not an interest which attaches to the chattel,
but rather a claim of priority as against other claimants."8 Such a claim of
priority is successful to the extent that a court will give it validity. In
the Contract State where the priority claim is initiated by the security
contract, the law there may and frequently does require the claimant
to perfect his claim in that state by such a procedure as public recording. 9
Such a requirement is a recognition of the fact that the security contract
itself does not create the priority. It is also a recognition of the fact
that the priority is a right ad personam and not attached to the chattel.
When, therefore, the chattel is removed to another state, no priority
claims are carried with it, unless the Removal State, now having complete
and unrestricted dominion over the chattel located within its borders,
voluntarily decides to recognize the outstate priority.
Even though the courts of the Removal State are inclined to favor the
situs theory, they face the same dilemma as the courts adhering to the
lex loci contractus theory. At the time the Removal State court is asked
to decide between the parties, a second contract has been made and the
chattel has a second situs. The security contract is made in reference
to the situs of the chattel at the time the contract is executed, but the subpurchaser's contract is made in the Removal State at a time when the
chattel has a new situs there. Consistent with the situs theory, therefore,
the bona fide subpurchaser may rightly maintain that the validity of his
contract of subpurchase and the rights it creates should be determined by
the new situs of the chattel, no matter whether that new situs was brought
about with or without the consent of the outstate secured party.20
While the situs theory, therefore, like the contract theory, may satisfy
the ends of justice when the litigation involves the parties to the creation
of the original security interest, neither provides a satisfactory guide when
a new interest or claim to priority is raised extraterritorially by a stranger
to the original transaction.
The court of the Removal State is thus justified in weighing as
res nova the respective and conflicting claims of the outstate secured
party and its own citizen who has in good faith parted with his money in
18. Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 542.
19. E.g., N.Y. Lien Law, § 230.
20. See Chief justice Marshall's opinion, p. 423.
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the belief that he was purchasing a chattel free of encumbrances. In other
words, the court of the forum is and should be free to follow its own
concepts of fairness and considerations of social expediency, there being
no overriding rule of conflict of laws controlling its decision.
In actual practice, the courts have done just that. Despite broad dicta
as to comity, lex loci contractus and lex loci rei, the courts, in favoring the
secured party, have decided the cases in accordance with their own general feeling as to what was fair, just, and socially expedient under the
circumstances. 2 1 Unfortunately, in many cases where the outstate secured party has been upheld, the court's attitude as to social expediency,
while not expressly controlled by the rules of conflict of laws, is unconsciously affected by the court's traditional respect for those rules.
The remainder of this article will discuss why there are more logical and
more compelling factors, both in precedent and in natural justice, for
giving judgment to the bona fide subpurchaser.
In taking a de novo view of the subject problem, the court will find
support in ancient principles, in new concepts of chattel negotiability,
and in the principles of fairness and natural justice, for deciding in favor
of the bona fide subpurchaser as against the outstate secured party.
ANCIENT STATUTORY AND CASE LAw

Early English statutes and case law demonstrate a general disfavor
of secret liens and a recognition of the doctrine of ostensible ownership
through possession. It is difficult to determine from the cases to what
extent these ancient principles were founded on case law and to what
extent they stem from the statutes, collectively known as the Fraudulent
Conveyances Statutes,22 which provided that where the grantor remained
in possession, after a conveyance of property, the conveyance was fraudulent and void as to creditors of the grantor, and such a conveyance was
likewise fraudulent and void as to bona fide purchasers from the grantor.
The early English cases described and treated the chattel mortgage
21. Stumberg, op. cit. supra note 2, at 366: "A majority of the courts feel that
preferences should be given the conditional vendor or mortgagees when the chattel is
wrongfully removed from the state where it was originally sold and the law there has
been complied with, because they think that it is better social policy to protect him
against a person who, although he is innocent, is claiming title through a wrongdoer
whose wrongful act is beyond the effective control of the vendor or mortgagee. In other

words, the point of view of a majority of the courts is that it is better social policy to
further the security of credit transactions by protecting, under the circumstances, the
holder of the lien." See also 18 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 553, 554 (1941).
22. 13 Eliz. 1, c. 5 (1571) ; 27 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1585). See also Glenn, The Chattel Mortgage
as a Statutory Security, 25 Va. L. Rev. 316, 324 (1939).
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as a "bill of sale to secure a debt." 23 In Twyne's Case,2 4 dealing with
a sale of personal property, the court decided that retention of possession by the vendor after the sale constituted a "badge of fraud" as
against creditors of the vendor who, being misled into believing that the
vendor owned the property because he was in possession, gave him credit
in reliance thereon. A later English case 5 applied the same principle
to a transaction involving a chattel mortgage where the mortgagor remained in possession. While the statutes and case law describe the mortgagor's retention of possession as "fraudulent" as to the mortgagor's
creditors and bona fide purchasers, the "fraud" consists in the fact that
both creditor and purchaser are misled into believing the mortgagor to
be the unencumbered owner of the chattel because of his possession.
This is still good law in many American jurisdictions. The philosophical
principle underlying this attitude is the sound doctrine of ostensible
ownership.2 6 The subpurchaser from the mortgagor relies in good faith
on his seller's having good title, because the mortgagor has what seems
to be free and unencumbered control of the chattel. The mortgagee has
voluntarily permitted the debtor to have possession, thereby placing it
within the debtor's power to sell and deliver the chattel to a bona fide
subpurchaser.
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF OWNERSHIP

To offset the appearance of ownership through possession, and to
afford a means whereby the mortgagee can maintain his priority claim,
although possession was granted to the mortgagor, a recording procedure
is frequently established by statute for the purpose of giving publicity to
the otherwise secret lien. The subpurchaser may thus have no just
claim to priority if at the time he makes his purchase he has actual
knowledge or notice of the prior outstanding claim of the secured party.
A proper constructive notice to the subpurchaser, by a public recording,
takes the place of actual knowledge and makes unreasonable the subpurchaser's reliance on possession of the debtor as ostensible ownership.
But the device of recording, as constructive notice, is ineffective when
the chattel is removed from one recording jurisdiction to another. It is
unrealistic to assume, as some courts have contended, that by publicly
registering the security interest contract in the Contract State, the
23. Glenn, supra note 22, at 316.
24. 3 Co. SOb (K-B. 1601).
25. Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Atk. 165 (ch. 1749). The court said: "As to the posession of the

goods, I have no other way of coming to the knowledge of the owner but by seeing who
is in possession of them ... ." Id. at 16S.
26. Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 1073 (1893) ; Glenn, supra note 22.

27. See Glenn, supra note 22, at 326.
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secured party has given constructive notice to the world. 28 In the first
place, it is generally held that constructive notice is limited only to the
classes of persons specifically referred to in the recording act. For
example, a recording of a chattel mortgage may, by statute, be constructive notice to a purchaser from the mortgagor. It is not constructive
notice, however, to one who deals with a tortfeasor mortgagor, without
having actual knowledge of the mortgagee's interest.29
No recording act has been found which expressly provides that the
constructive notice created by its application shall extend to purchasers
outside the state. Indeed, a state recording statute, inasmuch as it is a
state statute, must be deemed to affect only those parties within the state
of its enactment.
It is obvious that the words constructive notice can have no sensible
meaning unless they imply that the person constructively notified had
it within his power to achieve actual knowledge of the facts by a diligent
examination of the pertinent public records. 80 But the bona fide subpurchaser who buys a chattel located in his state, without knowledge
that it has been previously removed from another state, cannot be
reasonably expected to examine the public records, except in the state
where the chattel now is, and where the proposed seller now resides.
Assuming that he has diligently and properly made that examination,
and, of course, found no record of an outstate security interest, how can
it be held fair or just to him to construe the outstate recording as notice
to him, constructive or otherwise?
A half-way recognition that giving extraterritorial effect to constructive notice is unsound is to be found in the provisions of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act which, while it provides that the outstate secured
party's claim of priority shall continue in the Removal State, nevertheless requires the secured party to refile in the Removal State within ten
days after he receives knowledge or notice of the place to which the
he loses his priority as against subchattel has been removed; otherwise
3
sequent bona fide subpurchasers. 1
In a few states, the legislature has in effect prohibited the application of the rule of comity by providing that an outstate secured party
shall not prevail over the subpurchaser in the Removal State unless he
28. Sims v. McKeen & Stimson, 25 Iowa 341 (1868); Smith & Co. v. McLean, 24 Iowa
322 (1868); Ord Nat'l Bank v. Massey, 48 Kan. 762, 30 Pac. 124 (1892).
29. Motor Fin. Co. v. Noyes, 139 Me. 159, 28 A.2d 235 (1942).
30. Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 9 U. Pa. L. Rev. 12S,
135 (1944), citing 2 Tiffany, Real Property 2186 (2d ed. 1920), contends that a subse-

quent purchaser is charged with notice of an instrument only when "if he exercised proper
diligence, he would by searching the records, discover the existence and terms of such

instrument."
31. Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 14.
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records his security interest contract in the Removal State prior to the
subpurchase, 2 or within a fixed number of months after removalP The
requirement applies even though the chattel was removed without the
consent of the secured party, and he has no knowledge of the place
of removal.
Some courts contend that it is socially expedient to favor the outstate
secured party, because to allow the subpurchaser to prevail would
encourage fraudulent mortgagors and conditional vendees to move the
subject chattel to a state where they could unlawfully dispose of the
chattel free from encumbrance. 34 By giving judgment for the purchaser,
it is asserted, the courts would be making the Removal State a party to
the fraud. An analogy is drawn with the case of a thief who steals a chattel from its true owner in one state and then sells it in another. Obviously,
if the Removal State gave superior rights to the purchaser from the
thief, it would, to that extent, be giving legal encouragment to the latter.
Such courts are, however, in error on two counts. In the first place,
the analogy is ill-founded. The mortgagor or conditional vendee who
sells the chattel to a bona fide subpurchaser is not a thief. Modern business practice and the growing number of legal decisions which reflect
that practice, attribute most of the incidents of ownership to the mortgagor and conditional vendee and tend to restrict the proprietary rights
of the secured party to a mere security interest."3 The debtor has been
given lawful possession of the chattel by the holder of the security interest. His sale may be fraudulent, it is true, but not without much
color of right. In the second place, courts have not shrunk from giving
a good faith buyer valid title even though the buyer acquired his rights
from one who obtained title through fraud."' In such cases, the courts
have not considered judgment for the good faith buyer reprehensible
because tending to encourage the fraudulent party to acquire his title
by fraud.
32. Lee v. Bank of Georgia, 159 Fla. 481, 32 So.2d 7 (1947).
33. Ayares Small Loan Co. v. Maston, 7S Ga. App. 628, 51 S.E.2d 699 (1949).
34. Motor Investing Co. v. Breslauer, 64 Cal. App. 230, 221 Pac. 700 (1923).
35. "The conditional seller holds only a limited interest in the goods for the purpose
of security for the purchase price. This is as readily seen when the deal is viewed in its

legal aspects as in its business aspects." Void, Sales 291 (2d ed. 1959).
36. "[I1f, after the seller delivers possession to the buyer pursuant to a sale induced
by the buyer's fraud, the property has passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for
value, the right of the original seller to recover the property is lost ? ' 46 Am. Jur. Sales
§ 471 (1943), citing among others: Hickey v. McDonald, 151 Ala. 497, 44 So. 201 (1907);
Baehr v. Clark, 83 Iowa 313, 49 N.W. 840 (1891); Sinclair v. Healy, 40 Pa. 417, SO Am.
Dec. 589 (1861); Long v. McAvoy, 133 Wash. 472, 233 Pac. 930 (1925), afi'd, 135 Wash.
696, 236 Pac. 806 (1925) ; Rice v. Cutler, 17 Wis. 351, 84 Am. Dec. 747 (1263).
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MODERN STATUTORY AND CASE LAW

The legal power of one with less than complete ownership to transfer full ownership to a bona fide purchaser for value is being broadened
and strengthened by modern statutory and case law.
Section 24 of the Uniform Sales Act provides that a person, possessing
voidable title to goods, who sells them to a bona fide purchaser for value
before his title has been avoided, gives absolute title to the purchaser.
In section 25, the Uniform Sales Act provides, in effect, that a seller
of goods who has entirely parted with title by a sale to A, but remains
in possession of the goods after the sale, may give good title to the goods
through a second sale to B, provided B is a bona fide purchaser for
value.
Here the doctrine of ostensible ownership through possession is implicitly recognized and enforced. The seller's mere retention of possession gives the second buyer a superior claim to the chattel, undoubtedly
because he relied on the seller's possession as tantamount to title. Nobody-no court as far as is known, has ever criticized this provision
on the ground that the statute, by validating the unlawful and unauthorized second sale, has encouraged the seller in possession to practice
fraud. This statutory provision is a cogent indication of the instinctive
feeling of fairness and justice in the doctrine of ostensible ownership,
which is equivalent to an estoppel against the party who, though having
secret property rights in a chattel, permits another's possession of the
chattel to offer to the world the appearance of a chattel free from encumbrance.
What constitutes voidable title has been materially extended by
modern case law and particularly by modern statute. For example, the
Uniform Commercial Code provides that a person may give absolute title
by sale to a bona fide purchaser, even though the seller in that transaction
obtained title and delivery, (1) through deception as to his identity, no
matter how the deception was accomplished; (2) through exchange of a
check which is later dishonored; (3) although the transaction was a
"cash" sale; or (4) though the fraud was of such a nature as to be
7
punishable as larcenous under the criminal law.
The cumulative force and effect of the extension of rights to the good
faith buyer has been described as giving a kind of negotiability to
chattels and as creating a species of "holder in due commercial course of
goods."8 This new concept applies with greatest force where the good
faith buyer has made his purchase from a dealer who usually deals in the
goods in question, and the purchase is made "in the ordinary course of
37. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-403.
38. Preface to Void, op. cit. supra note 35, at x.
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business."3 One wonders whether we are not experiencing in America a
twentieth century adaptation of the ancient English rule of "market
overt." The rule was and is still law in England that a buyer at a
recognized market or fair who purchases goods there from a dealer
gains good title unless the true owner can prove that the goods were
actually stolen. 40 It is interesting to note that by the custom of the City
of London, every shop in the city is a market overt between the hours
of sunrise and sunset, except on Sundays and holidays.4 1
CONCLUSION

In the light of these new principles, let us re-examine the legal position
of the bona fide subpurchaser who, in the Removal State, has purchased
a chattel there located in the possession of a debtor. Let us bear in
mind that the debtor has been permitted to keep possession of the chattel by a secured party who, it is true, has by contract and by local law,
at a prior time and in another state, achieved a legal position of priority
in that state as to bona fide subpurchasers for value. But when the
chattel is brought into the Removal State, the outstate secured party
and the subpurchaser should have their respective claims examined de
novo within the frame of reference of the events taking place in the
Removal State and the local law applicable thereto. In this state, there is
no record of the secured party's claim. His security claim is just as
secret here as it would have been if unrecorded in the Contract State.
As between two innocent parties, it is a matter of natural justice to
hold against one who by his act helps to bring about the situation
which deceives the other innocent person. It may be argued that the
secured party has done all that he reasonably could be required to do
in order to prevent injury to innocent buyers. He has recorded his lien
in the Contract State, as provided by the laws of that state, and he has,
by his contract, forbidden the debtor to remove the chattel to another
state without his knowledge and consent. However, the secured party
has given physical possession of the chattel to his debtor. It is presumed
that before he did so, he investigated the character and standing of the
debtor. If the debtor has deceived him, he, the secured party, should
take the risk of loss,' and not a later subpurchaser who has a reasonable
39. "The triumph of the good faith purchaser has been one of the most dramatic
episodes in our legal history. In his several guises, he serves a commercial function: be is
protected ... to the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in without elaborate
investigation of property rights and in reliance on the posession of property by one who
offers it for sale or to secure a loan." Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith

Purchase, 63 Yale L.J. 1057 (1954).
40. Pease & Chitty, Markets and Fairs 75 (1958).
41. Id. at 77.

42. See, e.g., Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 455 (1948).
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right to rely on the debtor's possession, and on whatever record search
in the state of purchase a reasonable buyer would undertake.
Consequently, in view of traditional legal principles dealing with secret
liens and the balance of equities between the parties, the bona fide
subpurchaser should prevail.
There is, of course, less common law support for finding in favor of
a bona fide subpurchaser where the security interest takes the form of a
conditional sale, rather than that of a chattel mortgage. For instance,
the chattel mortgage, as has been pointed out, has from very early times
been considered a secret lien, void as against bona fide subpurcbasers
unless publicly recorded. The conditional sale, on the other hand, was
traditionally considered to be a mere bailment, ripening into a sale only
when the bailee had paid the full purchase price. 43 On this theory, since
the bailee had no property interest in the chattel whatsoever, but merely
a possessory interest, he could give no title at all to even the bona fide
subpurchaser who bought the chattel without knowledge of the title
reserved in the conditional vendor. But in the majority of the states
this view no longer holds.4
Even in the states that follow the old common law rule, the conditional
vendee is given greater rights in the chattel than that of a mere gratuitous bailee.45 Judge Learned Hand insists that the conditional vendee
should be recognized as owner since he is actually considered so by the
commercial community.4" States which declare that conditional sales are
chattel mortgages say in effect that the conditional vendor's security
interest is a mere lien, and so ownership is in the vendee.
The enactment of the recording provisions 47 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and similar state statutes is in effect a legislative condemnation of the conditional vendor's secret security interest, similar to
that concerning chattel mortgages. These provisions also, as in the case
of chattel mortgages, establish that the secured party's priority over
subsequent subpurchasers is not due to his security contract but ensues
from the act of recording which is extrinsic to the contract.
Suppose the rule is universally adopted that, except as to stolen goods,
43. See, e.g., Glenn, The Conditional Sale at Common Law and as a Statutory Security,
25 Va. L. Rev. 559, 574 (1939); Vold, The Divided Property Interest in Conditional Sales,
78 U. Pa. L. Rev. 713 (1930).
44. Void, op. cit. supra note 35, at 291.
45. Ibid.
46. In Re Lake's Laundry, Inc., 79 F.2d 326, 328 (2d Cir. 1935) (dissenting opinion).
47. Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 5.
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possession implies ostensible ownership and the risk of loss is thus
placed on the holder of the security interest. The financial institutions,
which are the principal agencies for sales financing through security
transactions of the kind under discussion, are well able to take the
financial burden involved in the relatively small number of cases of
unauthorized chattel removals. If the secured parties do not wish to
take this risk for themselves, there are means of insuring against the risk
and passing on the insurance costs as expenses of the security transaction.
But one is still met with the unsatisfying necessity of choosing in
favor of one innocent party and against another. A procedure which
would be fair to both parties would be the establishment of a national recording act providing a central agency at which a secured party
might record the security instrument and thus give constructive notice
to all purchasers throughout the United States. g The federal statute
should provide that in the event the secured party fails to file under
the national law, and the chattel is subsequently removed to another
state, a bona fide purchaser in the Removal State will take free of the
security interest. By restricting application of the federal recordation
act only to those transactions in which the chattel is moved across state
borders, administrative difficulties would be materially reduced, and the
constitutionality of the exercise of federal power might be assured. By
using the language and procedure proposed herein, the rights of the
secured party would be cut off by the statute only if the chattel is moved
across state lines. The rights of the secured party would not be affected
by the federal statute as long as the chattel remained in the state in
which it was located at the time the security contract was made. The
federal recordation act would therefore be a proper exercise of constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. Federal recordation as
a prerequisite to maintaining the priority of security interests is not
new. It is now established and in practice with regard to the transfer of
interests in airplanes, 9 ships,5 0 patents," and federal copyrights.Y
48. "Since federal ability to establish an exclusive recordation system for moveables
derives more correctly from the general power of Congress over interstate commerce . ..
chattels other than air and water craft might also be covered by federal statute....
A single centralized system would fully protect both lienor and purchaser." Note, Federal
Recordation of Title to Intrastate Aircraft, 48 Colum. L. Rev. 1248, 1250 (1948).
49. Interstate Commerce Act, 72 Stat. 772 (1958), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1403 (Supp. 1958)
(Federal Aviation Program).
50. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, § 30c, 41 Stat. 1000 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 921 (1952).
51. United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1952).
52. United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 30 (1947).
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While the extension of this procedure to other more numerous security
interests creates a larger administrative problem, the only practical difficulty is the size which such an agency must assume in order to be
effective. With the machines currently available for handling voluminous detail, these administrative difficulties are not at all insurmountable.
In view of the growing interstate flow of persons with chattels, especially automobiles, which are covered by security interests, a solution
of the problem through federal recordation is almost a matter of social
necessity.

